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For much of the past seventy-plus years since its independence, Myanmar, often known as Burma, was an isolated military dictatorship plagued by 
seemingly perpetual civil war. Widespread protests in 
1988 resulted in extreme military brutality and further 
entrenchment of autocratic rule. In the decades 
after, however, the country’s pro-democracy activists 
became an inspiration to many around the world. 
Since then, perceptions of the country have oscillated 
between hopeful—that the country can successfully 
transition to peace and democracy through a historic 
reform process—and dismay that the country is not 
progressing as so many around the world had wished. 
This disappointment has been punctuated most 
starkly by accusations that its military committed 
genocide against the country’s Muslim Rohingya 
population in 2017. 
Myanmar’s evolution from military dictatorship 
began in 2010. While much has changed in the 
years since, much has not. After two semi-elected 
governments and a third set to take office next year, 
it is a good time to reflect on the project of changing 
Myanmar—its intents, successes and failures, and 
prospects for the future. For those questioning the 
nature of the transition, starting with its intentions, 
achieving a shared sense of “normalcy” seems to 
be the most common denominator. Across a wide 
range of actors—the military, democracy advocates, 
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simplest terms, is to no longer be an 
isolated pariah state rife with cripplingly 
poverty, oppression, and ethnic strife. 
This essay reflects on how a grounded 
sense of “normalcy” is desirable for 
Myanmar’s transition, showing that 
any sober assessment of the military’s 
involvement in politics and the state’s 
entrenched dysfunction requires that the 
international community dispense with 
grand hopes for the country’s transition. 
Instead, international actors should seek to 
embrace the country’s complexity in order 
to support its pursuit of normalization.
Myanmar’s transition can thus be 
understood as a “search for normalcy.” 
Generally speaking, the world has 
embraced this search. What “normalcy” 
ultimately looks like is surely different for 
different countries, but most longed for 
a Myanmar that was no longer a global 
outcast comparable to North Korea. 
Many countries, from the United States to 
China, accordingly engaged the military in 
a structured process to support change, 
hoping that gradual reforms would add up 
to structural changes in how the country 
is governed. Even the West saw positive 
change as possible, albeit only tentatively 
in the early years. 
Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, the National 
League for Democracy (NLD), also implicitly 
accepted this gradualism when they 
contested the 2012 by-elections for national 
parliament. Despite deep reservations 
about the military’s claim that they would 
manage the transition towards “discipline 
flourishing democracy”, this nonetheless 
signalled that the party was joining the 
transition project for the duration. Working 
within the confines of the 2008 Constitution 
would be the medium through which the 
NLD sought to achieve full democratization, 
which, in turn, could possibly include 
reforming or replacing that constitution. 
The military, for its part, seemingly 
realized that they had to welcome the 
NLD back into the political process. Aung 
San Suu Kyi was then a global icon of 
democracy; excluding her and her party was 
simply not an option. instead, the military 
appreciated that achieving economic 
growth and international acceptance 
required her involvement in the transition. 
If Suu Kyi remained under house arrest 
and actively derided the 2008 Constitution 
as regressive and undemocratic, the 
international community would never 
accept the transition, thereby leaving 
crippling sanctions in place. 
Indeed, Suu Kyi’s decision to participate 
in the 2012 by-elections, where she and 
her party members won a good number 
of parliamentary seats, gave global 
legitimacy to the changes unfolding in 
Myanmar. Her participation encouraged 
greater international engagement with 
the Thein Sein government, even if this 
required international actors to accept the 
parameters of change laid down by the 
military in their 2008 Constitution. After 
winning elections in a landslide in November 
2015, however, Suu Kyi assumed executive 
power as the “State Counselor”, thereby 
effectively overcoming the Constitution’s 
prohibition on those with children who 
are foreign nationals—as she does—from 
holding the presidency. 
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ENTRENCHED STATE DYSFUNCTION 
In 2016, the de facto head of state Aung San Suu Kyi, 
together with her NLD, assumed responsibility for a state 
apparatus that was far from fully under their control. The 
military had meticulously designed the 2008 Constitution 
to ensure outright military control over both the security 
apparatus and their major economic interests, along with 
prosecutorial immunity for past transgressions and a 
veto-proof presence in parliament over the constitution. 
As the cherry on top, the military guaranteed itself 
one vice-president post and a majority in the National 
Security Council. Myanmar was thus left with a split 
government—one that was nominally democratic and 
led by civilians, but with the military securely immersed 
in the country’s politics, governance, and economy. 
Unsurprisingly, the military defined the transition by 
its own prerogatives. Pro-democracy political parties like 
the NLD, as well as the dozens of ethnic armed groups, 
repeatedly contested those privileges, refusing to accept 
a political settlement that was not based on consensual 
federalism achieved through negotiations. Hence, the 
transition has essentially been a contest of “competitive 
governance” between the military and elected civilian 
government. This, in turn, is framed against questions 
of who belongs in Myanmar and how they should jointly 
rule the country; sensitivities of this sort manifest most 
starkly in Myanmar’s many insurgent groups, but they 
are present across the incredibly diverse country.
After decades of misrule and stagnation, the political 
jockeying for control of the state—and hence control 
over setting the transition forward—was lamentable. 
Myanmar in 2010 was plagued by deep and widespread 
poverty, ongoing conflicts across the periphery in its 
near entirety, and a state apparatus that not only had 
little capacity to provide services but was habituated 
towards autocratic rule through surveillance and 
coercion. Reforming the state apparatus was always 
going to be a massive challenge.  
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This general dysfunction meant that for the newly 
elected governments, particularly the NLD in 2015 but 
to some extent also the pro-military Union Solidarity 
and Development Party (USDP) that assumed power 
in 2011, the transition needed to initially show  basic 
competence to govern in the most rudimentary ways—
by improving healthcare, education, infrastructure, and 
jobs—rather than focusing solely on achieving major 
structural reforms. This is not to say that the latter were 
not sought; they were, and some were achieved, notably 
in telecommunications, currency exchange, debt relief, 
and decentralization. 
What is often missed in the story of Myanmar’s 
recent past, however, is just how weak the state was 
in terms of basic competence. The country’s previous 
military dictatorship did not translate into a strong state 
apparatus. The state was able to stifle the opposition 
with predatory bureaucracy and brutal military 
crackdowns, but behind this façade state function was 
spectacularly limited. 
Myanmar could not afford to be a heavy police state 
such as those seen in the Soviet bloc or in modern day 
North Korea. Instead, much of its oppression was left to 
and achieved by the banal levers of local administration. 
Myanmar’s counter-insurgency campaigns involved the 
widespread use of proxy militias, who were left to run 
loose and brutally clear civilian populations. This was, 
to put it simply, counterinsurgency on the cheap. 
Since 2010, the sheer extent of the country’s dysfunction 
has overshadowed prospects for change. Myanmar’s 
would-be reformists—ranging from those merely 
wishing to push a façade of change to bolster economic 
growth all the way to the true believers—faced the 
seemingly overwhelming problem of how to structure 
and sequence reforms. When everything needs reform, 
where do you even start? The magnitude challenge of 
overcoming Myanmar’s compounding social, political, 
and economic ailments seemed near insurmountable. 
The complexity of it all overshadowed and threatened 
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to overwhelm reforming even the most 
banal aspects of basic governance. 
A foundation of such governance 
needed to be laid to achieve the state 
building that similar countries had done 
post-independence in the 1950s and 1960s. 
With the state near dysfunctional from the 
top down and an economy lagging decades 
behind its regional peers, the need of basic 
competence—to manage budgets, improve 
basic education and health, build roads—
was imperative. In this sense, the “transition” 
was less about emerging from dictatorship 
and more about achieving rudimentary 
coherence as a state, something that 
should have been done decades before. 
International actors seeking to put Myanmar 
on a path to “normalcy” were far too 
often blind to the country’s need for basic 
governance structures.
AN ENDURING ROLE 
FOR THE MILITARY 
President Thein Sein’s USDP government, 
which reigned from 2011 to 2016, sought 
reforms in economic governance, ceasefires 
and a peace process, and engagement 
with the West. The USDP pursued these 
reforms because party leaders longed for 
a sense of normalcy, and hence legitimacy, 
from both the international community and 
Myanmar’s public. Yes, these leaders were 
former military, but they too were tired of 
Myanmar’s global pariah status. During 
the USDP government there were tensions 
at times with the military—for instance 
over leadership of the peace process—
but generally, the government and military 
worked together well enough. These 
tensions were often overshadowed by the 
feud between the speaker of the lower 
house of parliament—Shwe Mann, who had 
been the number three general in the junta—
and his former colleagues in the military 
and presidency. 
Even as the NLD assumed power in early 
2016, many political analysts were surprised 
by the extent of accommodation the military 
seemed to be giving the new government. 
Building off its earlier themes of wanting 
to shed pariah status, there seemed to be a 
pragmatic realization that ongoing détente, 
and even engagement with the NLD and 
Suu Kyi, was needed, at least publicly. With 
that in mind, and despite some performative 
critiques, the military accepted the creation 
of the State Counselor position and her de 
facto role as head of state.  
It is unclear, though, if the military ever 
expected the NLD to come to power when 
they drafted the 2008 Constitution. While 
the military undoubtedly wanted the 
transition to proceed in terms of “discipline 
flourishing democracy”—i.e. at a pace it felt 
comfortably in control of and especially if it 
produced significant economic growth while 
protecting their core security interests—the 
military was also happy to let the civilian 
government take responsibility, and hence 
blame, for any of the country’s misfortunes. 
As such, by 2016 military leaders were 
distancing themselves from many matters 
of routine governance so as to allow the 
NLD government to proverbially hang itself 
with its own rope. 
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For decades in Asia—and in Myanmar 
(then Burma) during and after the 1962 
coup—debates have raged over the merits 
of autocratic but relatively competent 
governance, including that led by generals, 
in comparison to the seeming chaos and 
ineptitude of electoral democracy. Militaries 
in Asia, like those in many other regions, 
have long claimed that they are simply 
more competent to develop countries 
economically and provide stability; in return, 
their respective publics must accept the 
loss of rights. Autocratic populism has seen 
a surge of popularity in recent years across 
the world, including in the West. 
Opposition towards electoral 
democracy has similarly not disappeared 
in Myanmar. Since 2010, such opposition 
has occurred regularly, with the military 
encouraging Buddhist nationalists to 
support discriminatory race laws and 
questioning the NLD’s competence and 
intentions. The military has also excelled 
at placing Suu Kyi and the NLD in awkward 
political positions that would expose 
them to criticism from both Western and 
domestic supporters. A prime instance was 
placing her on commissions to investigate 
violence in Rakhine State in 2014 where 
she would become front and centre to both 
international and domestic debates over 
the Rohingya crisis. Indeed, the military 
has since 2010 repeatedly put the country’s 
democrats in “lose-lose” situations. Doing 
so has for the military become something of 
a rather refined art form.
CHOOSING A WAY FORWARD
Compounding these tensions and adding 
complexity to the country’s politics are 
contested narratives of change and 
legitimacy. Many in Myanmar believe 
that a better future will come with 
parliamentary democracy, while others 
insist on starting with a negotiated peace 
settlement premised on federalism. While 
not necessarily mutually exclusive, these 
two positions are nonetheless hard to 
synchronize emotionally and politically 
across the spectrum of Myanmar’s society 
and politics. It is also hard to make them 
coexist in the practical terms of specific near-
term reforms, such as with decentralization 
efforts. These tensions raise all sorts of 
“chicken-or-egg” conundrums, including 
whether there should be constitutional 
reform or decentralization before a peace 
agreement lays out a federal future.
Amid these quandaries, it is useful to focus 
on what is feasible for the country in terms of 
transitioning to what can be understood as 
“normal”, or at least on a trajectory towards 
“normalization”. As Myanmar’s Southeast 
Asian peers indicate, “normalcy” can 
refer to controlling state territory through 
consent, providing basic governance and 
social services, and growing an economy 
based on legitimate sources of income 
that can lift the wider population out of 
poverty. There may be autocracy and illicit 
economies present but not enough to result 
in global condemnation and isolation. With 
time, Myanmar might even grow a healthier 
sense of nationalism—i.e. as an “imagined 
community”—that dissuades widespread 
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insurrection. Perhaps a shared sense of what is 
“normal” and a palpable sense of progress towards it 
is the only way to overcome massive ethnic, religious, 
and social cleavages. 
Indeed, as the transition was beginning, The 
Economist remarked that compared to the violence 
concurrently unfolding in the Middle East’s “Arab 
Spring”, Myanmar’s historic flux appeared to be 
progressing as a “revolution without losers” (7 April 
2012 Edition). Most stakeholders did, in fact, accept 
that gradual evolution, rather than abrupt, seismic 
change, was needed to bring the country from military 
dictatorship to something else that would be roughly 
democratic and market-oriented, as well as more 
accommodating of the country’s diversity. Simply put, 
Myanmar just wanted to be another “normal” Southeast 
Asian country, generally trending for the better but with 
the ups and downs experienced by everybody else. This 
observation often escaped outsiders looking in, who 
generally had grand expectations of quick change, be 
it economic, political, or for a peace deal. Domestically, 
however, the idea of some potentially quick winner-
take-all revolution had lost its appeal. 
Within the country there is an immense amount 
of hope for change but also exceptional levels of 
pragmatism and patience. Outsiders have tended to 
romanticize or sensationalize the country, for better 
or worse. Within Myanmar, though, more moderated 
hopes are prominent. It is from a greater sense of these 
expectations from within Myanmar that the country’s 
transition should be weighed. 
When Suu Kyi famously said she was just a 
Myanmar politician rather than a global icon for 
democracy, it was a plea for acceptance of her relative 
normalcy as a party leader and legislator. Or, it was at 
least a hope to be left alone to get on with what she 
wanted to do most—reform Myanmar, rather than 
save the world. Her parameters for what was needed 
and possible were defined by Myanmar’s domestic 
politics and her political capital to widen and shape the 
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confines of the 2008 Constitution’s path for 
the country. She certainly did not turn down 
the global accolades that came her way, but 
one would be hard pressed to show that she 
was driven by achieving global fame rather 
than securing a better future for her country. 
Many Nobel laureates have enjoyed lucrative 
lives dispelling wisdom around the world, 
but she chose to stay home. It is worth 
remembering that.  
Even the military, the Tatmadaw, has 
its complexes about what it means to 
be “normal”. Since its earliest days, the 
Tatmadaw has been gnawed at by what 
could best be understood as an inferiority 
complex. Shortly after independence, Karen 
National Union insurgents nearly succeeded 
in capturing Rangoon, today Yangon, and the 
Chinese nationalist Kuomintang incursion in 
1949 onwards left large parts of the country 
under foreign control. This deepened in the 
military a sense of weakness and inadequacy 
that manifested itself brutally over time as 
the armed forces took autocratic control 
of the country. More recently, reading the 
Tatmadaw’s 2015 White Paper on defense 
policy, one is struck by the sense of it wants 
to shed the toxic abnormality of its modern 
history and become a “professional” military. 
It is telling that one of the first reform areas 
that international agencies succeeded in 
engaging the military was preventing child 
soldiers. Self-respecting militaries simply 
did not partake in such wretched practices. 
More significantly, for the military, 
an economic rationale for change has 
been primary: normalcy means economic 
growth. The refrain amongst the country’s 
elite over the 2000s that they were “tired 
of being poorer than Laos” was grating. As 
that decade wore on, over-dependence on 
China and the risks of outright economic 
collapse in much of Myanmar were more of 
an existential threat than anything else; the 
military recognized that. 
Perhaps most significantly, the country’s 
complexes about wanting to be “normal” 
extend to the most odious event of recent 
years. The 2017 exodus of the Muslim 
Rohingya from the Rakhine State, where 
they faced vicious persecution from the 
Tatmadaw, understandably provoked 
global outrage. Across the world, many 
were aghast that so much of the country’s 
leadership, including Suu Kyi, and public 
seemed ambivalent about the plight of the 
Rohingya. Such sentiments were widely 
true: At best, most Myanmar citizens do 
not hold the Rohingya in positive regard, to 
say the least; at worst, most refuse to even 
consider the Rohingya rightful members of 
Myanmar’s national community. What was 
striking within the country, however, was the 
resentment that Myanmar’s citizens near-
universally felt about the term “genocide.”
Few words have such uniquely negative 
connotations for a country. The accusation 
of “genocide” thus grated across Myanmar’s 
political spectrum because it again made 
the country a global outcast facing scorn 
from Brussels to Washington and beyond. 
Even for those Myanmar people who saw 
the Rakhine crisis as the military’s fault, it 
was hard for them not to resent the global 
accusation, which risked superseding all 
the positive changes that had and were still 
unfolding.     
This observation neither condones 
the actions taken by the military nor lower 
expectations of positive change by the NLD 
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and Suu Kyi. Instead, it highlights the grossly 
myopic hopes that pervaded international 
expectations for the country in the early 
years of the transition until the pendulum 
swung the other way and the country was 
wholly condemned for singular issues in 
Rakhine. All of these hopes were based on 
perceptions of the exceptional. This was 
particularly true for the West, whose leaders 
personalized their hopes for the country in 
Suu Kyi herself. Her near deification abroad, 
especially in the West, was ultimately 
counterproductive for the country. These 
expectations never could have been met. 
CELEBRATING 
NORMALIZATION IS OKAY
Although it is hard to see Myanmar as 
“normal” right now, it is important to 
remember that the country is in the midst 
of an important process of normalization. 
There are near endless reasons to let 
cynicism and doubt drive international 
understandings of the country because there 
are still massive problems unfolding, such as 
the Rakhine crisis and the drug trade. Rather 
than undermine one’s hopes for Myanmar, 
these issues should remind outsiders to 
have more pragmatic expectations for the 
country. The military designed the transition 
so that they could manipulate the pace and 
scope of change in the country; Myanmar’s 
present reality is thus a story of five decades 
of military dictatorship and about seven to 
eight years-worth of conditioned reform.
In other words, what is needed is patience 
and the celebration of relative normalcy in all 
its boring forms, like planning and budgeting, 
building new roads and ensuring garbage 
collection, empowering communities to 
participate in development, and nudging 
forward an economy that was stuck 
between the socialist planning of the 1960s 
and the crony capitalism endemic after the 
1988 coup. The country’s exceptionalism 
was over-sold for far too long. Celebrating 
normalcy does not mean accepting 
dysfunction, mediocrity, and violence, just 
more thoughtful, grounded expectations of 
what is possible  in what is going to be an 
extended process of gradualism—at best, 
a slow but steady change spread across 
many reform areas.
For those who believe in liberal 
democracy within the country and 
across the world, there is an onus to help 
Myanmar’s elected governments show that 
they can govern. Myanmar’s public needs 
to believe that democracy can lead to the 
normalization of the country, represented by 
economic growth, international acceptance, 
increasingly representative government, 
and improved living standards. The best 
leverage elected governments have against 
the military is proving their competence to 
govern and deliver the essential changes 
that the public desires most—jobs and 
poverty alleviation, stability and progress 
towards peace, basic infrastructure such 
as local roads and bridges, and improving 
social services like health and education. 
Framing Myanmar’s domestic prospects is 
also the reality that the last decade has been 
distinctly abnormal for the whole world. The 
rise of autocratic populism, rising geopolitical 
tensions between China and the United 
States, economic flux and technological 
revolutions, and now an historic pandemic 
are evidence of that. If Myanmar’s transition 
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had started a decade or two earlier, it 
might have achieved different results or at 
least been in better sync with the times. 
For instance, it might have captured some 
of the market success pioneered by the 
Asian Tigers; geopolitics, meanwhile, might 
have been more conducive to international 
cooperation in Myanmar. Rather, economic 
growth models have moved on, Great 
Power geopolitics have intensified, and the 
liberal international order is more widely 
questioned. The United Nations is weaker 
than ever before and divided by squabbling 
powers. There is widespread resentment 
within developing countries over what are 
perceived to be lopsided applications of 
international justice.  
Within these wider considerations, the 
project of changing Myanmar—its intents, 
successes, failures, and prospects for 
the future—remains cloudy. The sheer 
complexity of the country and its entrenched 
dysfunction means that there is no quick 
fix and will be no singular moment of 
massive change. Those who care about 
the country must, accordingly, question the 
grand plans—that a single peace process 
is feasible or that the constitution can be 
amended or replaced just once—that have 
become entrenched behind paradigms of 
international support for Myanmar.
Moreover, many of the conceptual 
frameworks that help define international 
support now seem archaic and misplaced 
in Myanmar, stuck as they are in the early 
2000s of liberal-minded state-building. Try 
to frame Myanmar in one way or another 
and it all blends together as an alphabet 
soup of conceptual frameworks that lead to 
over-simplification and false hopes. There 
is no magic paradigm for understanding 
Myanmar; it is too complex. Trying to frame 
the country in such terms results in over 
simplified hopes for the linear progression 
that the international community was so 
keen to support. A single peace process 
and a couple elections were never going to 
change the country.  
Outside actors must, therefore, pursue 
what is possible rather than what is simply 
wished. Namely, observers should ask, “what 
is the target for change when everything 
seems so problematic and exceptional?” 
and seek a sense of normalcy relative to 
what is possible for Myanmar. The country 
is searching for a semblance of normalcy, 
mostly benchmarked against the relative 
successes and failures of its neighbors in 
Southeast Asia. Reform does not mean 
crossing a clear threshold whereby the 
country is blessed with normalcy; rather, it 
means working methodically to untangle the 
messy, convoluted knot that is Myanmar’s 
governance, politics, and economics and 
being patient throughout the process. All 
things considered, Myanmar is progressing 
in important ways that should neither be 
taken for granted nor forgotten. 
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For much of the past seventy-plus years since its 
independence, Myanmar, often known as Burma, was 
an isolated military dictatorship plagued by seemingly 
perpetual civil war. Myanmar’s evolution from military 
dictatorship began in 2010 when a wide-ranging reform 
process began. While much has changed in the years 
since, much has not. Myanmar’s transition can best be 
understood as a “search for normalcy.” Since 2010, the 
sheer extent of the country’s dysfunction after decades 
of military dictatorship has overshadowed prospects for 
change as has the mass exodus of Rohingya in 2017 
after a brutal campaign by the military. Amid these 
quandaries, it is useful to focus on what is feasible 
for the country in terms of transitioning to what can 
be understood as “normal”, or at least on a trajectory 
towards “normalization”. Framing Myanmar’s domestic 
prospects is also the reality that the last decade has 
been distinctly abnormal for the whole world. Reform in 
Myanmar means working methodically to untangle the 
messy, convoluted knot that is Myanmar’s governance, 
politics, and economics and being patient throughout 
the process. All things considered, Myanmar is 
progressing in important ways that should neither be 
taken for granted nor forgotten.
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